Ma'atara Provenance and Parable — technical overview
PATENT PENDING — Ma'atara Protocol. Reviewed 21 September 2026.
This overview separates integration capabilities from claims requiring additional evidence. It reflects current source and package checks, not an independent security audit or a fresh end-to-end production certification. Older August v3-only and temporary-healing descriptions are obsolete.
Products
| Product | Purpose | Host |
|---|---|---|
| Ma'atara Provenance | Register and verify signed provenance; search registered fingerprints; publish AI-use preferences | maatara.io |
| Parable | Encrypted notes and attachments with signed history | parable.social |
| Identity portal | Identity onboarding and approved product/device authorization | id.maatara.io |
Provenance fingerprinting runs at the endpoint. The service receives derived evidence rather than source files for those workflows. Notes encrypts title, body, tags and private attachment metadata before storage. Public provenance evidence, routing metadata and traffic patterns remain observable.
MP's Protect UI supports images and video, with a separate writing workflow. Detect currently supports images only; backend search routes do not imply matching product UI workflows. Shared/backend audio capsule support exists, but MP has no audio workflow. This is not a current MP audio capability claim.
Optional Notes AI chat is an explicit plaintext-egress exception to the selected model provider, disclosed at use. The product attempts to record a non-content commitment; it must not claim every turn is durably journaled.
Capability boundaries
| Capability | Reviewed status and limits |
|---|---|
| Native records | SDK supports v4; current Core code includes v4 reads and appends. Preserve returned profiles and validate with the SDK |
| Device authorization | Implemented; enabled in checked Core, Aegis and resolver production configuration. Origin, capability, epoch and revocation checks still apply |
| Delegation-aware root rotation | Separate gated feature; not implied by device verification |
| Temporary legacy healing | Retired, HTTP 410; not an available recovery route |
| Current-word content recovery | Requires supported recovery enrollment/state. Cannot recreate lost historical random keys |
| Encrypted user configuration | Implemented for supported configuration namespaces; not a claim that every product setting is encrypted or recoverable |
| Pairwise and hybrid messaging | Experimental toolkit entry points; production profiles disabled |
| Independent witness | Experimental implementation, not a production-operated independent service |
| Hardware signing | Not a universal property of browser/WASM custody |
| External ledger anchoring | Sepolia test-network configuration; automatic publication disabled; Bitcoin publication not implemented |
| C2PA and general ZK claims | No C2PA conformance or general zero-knowledge proof-system claim follows from this SDK |
Source configuration and npm publication do not prove live activation. Verify the deployment's service/build identity and relevant behavior separately.
What evidence establishes
| Evidence | What it supports | What it does not establish |
|---|---|---|
| Valid signature | A signing key authenticated the checked record | Legal identity, authorship, ownership or truth |
| Verified chain transitions | Linked records satisfy the checked authority rules | That a server supplied all records or the freshest history |
| Fingerprint match | A measured relationship to registered evidence | How the work was produced or whether use was lawful |
| Service timestamp | The service recorded a claim at the reported time | Independently witnessed time |
| Finalized external inclusion | The checked commitment exists in the specified ledger | Truth or ownership of the underlying content |
| No match or no record returned | The queried service returned no matching evidence | That nobody ever made a claim or the content never existed |
Use the SDK for record validation. A server verification response remains a server claim; offline verification requires the applicable released verifier and the full relevant evidence. An internal or unavailable verifier cannot be described as publicly reproducible.
Privacy and query limits
Public text search returns owner_ref; image/video searches return ownerRef. These are stable pseudonyms, not anonymity guarantees. Candidate identifiers and known content can support correlation. Capsule and provenance evidence can expose public attribution.
Text routes accept SDK-produced vectors and reject prose. Because the server does not receive the source text, it cannot attest that a caller's vector represents particular prose. A match concerns submitted evidence, not server-observed authorship.
Search is rate-limited. Browser calls may also be origin-restricted; command-line availability does not imply every third-party browser origin is admitted. Use the documented integration/origin process rather than assuming anonymous means unrestricted.
Time, endpoint and recovery limits
A service-recorded anchor is not confirmed ledger inclusion. A configured contract address does not prove recent publication. Independently check network, transaction, root and finality before making a timestamp claim.
A compromised endpoint can expose unlocked content and keys. Passkey-assisted software custody is not automatically hardware-rooted signing. Independent rollback/freshness evidence remains necessary when local checkpoints are lost; whole-profile erasure is not a guaranteed safe recovery operation. Availability and traffic analysis remain separate concerns.
Standards, licensing and review
Native choices are ML-DSA-65, ML-KEM-768, SHA3-384 and AES-256-GCM. Using standardized algorithms is not implementation certification. AI-use preferences are discoverable signals, not technical enforcement or automatic legal rights. AI-Pref projections must be described by their implemented revision; TDMRep is a Community Group report, not a W3C Recommendation.
| Public package | Source / npm on 21 September 2026 | Licence |
|---|---|---|
@maatara/pqc-toolkit | 2.2.1 / 2.2.1 | BSL-1.1 |
@maatara/veritas-chain | 2.2.1 / 2.2.1 | BSL-1.1 |
@maatara/aegis-pure | 0.2.0 / 0.2.0 | Apache-2.0 |
@maatara/aegis-encoder | 0.1.0 / 0.1.0 | BSL-1.1 |
Review each shipped licence. Publication is not a blanket production-use or patent licence. Implementation details needed for formal review beyond public SDK contracts should be requested through licensing@rmesolutions.com.au. This page does not disclose internal derivation, fingerprint algorithms, scoring recipes, signing-message layouts or patent claim construction.
Reproducible public discovery
curl https://api.ma-atara.io/health
curl https://api.ma-atara.io/api/version
curl https://api.ma-atara.io/api/capabilities
curl https://aegis.ma-atara.io/api/capabilities
curl https://aegis.ma-atara.io/api/anchor/status
curl https://did.ma-atara.io/.well-known/did.json
curl https://consent.maatara.io/.well-known/ai-consent
curl https://consent.maatara.io/.well-known/tdmrep.json
Retain the responses and date with any assessment. These probes establish reported behavior, not an independent cryptographic assessment. See Packages, Testing and PQC readiness.